By Hayim A. Raviv [Tel Aviv, Bamahane in Hebrew, 24 Jul 91, pp. 24-27]

Within 10 to 15 years, the water situation in the Middle East will become the main focus of violent conflict: as countries in the region run dry, the battle over water becomes inevitable. That is the general opinion among many experts both within the region and outside. It is also the conclusion reached by studies conducted in the past two years. They foresee a conflagration likely to break out in one or more of the region's three principle water systems: the Nile system, which serves Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia; the Euphrates-Hidqal (Tigris) system, which serves Turkey, Syria and Iraq; and the Jordan-Yarmukh system, in which Jordan, Syria, and Israel have a stake. The risks of war over water are ranked in this order: the "hottest" area of the Euphrates basin, followed by the Jordan basin and finally the Nile basin.

Indeed, more than one of these areas has stood on the threshold of war fought over water problems. In 1974, when it seemed to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat that Mengistu, Ethiopia's Marxist ruler, was planning to divert the sources of the Nile with Soviet assistance, he threatened to dispatch air force planes to bomb Ethiopia, The same year, Syria and Iraq nearly came to blows for similar reasons. Syria had built a number of dams on the Euphrates River, which caused a large reduction in the flow of the river into Iraqi territory. Iraq concentrated military forces along the border and threatened to shell the "Al-Tura" dam in Syria. Only the intervention of Arab mediators persuaded Syria to increase the allocation of water flowing into Iraq. The Iraqi threat was diffused. For years, water disputes have burdened Syria's relations with Iraq on one border and with Turkey on another. Tensions have often risen to the breaking point. On the eve of the Gulf war, Saddam Husayn accused Turkey of violating international water laws. In an interview King Husayn granted "the Independent" two years ago, he declared that he would not hesitate to go to war over water.

Israel's relations with the confirmation states have also included an element of friction, sometimes open and sometimes covert, regarding water sources. The American international expert in water matters, Joyce Starr, argues in a recently published study that the region's water is 'dwindling away' the explosion is a question only of time. Investigators at the Geographical Institute in Tel Aviv, however, have a different view. They contend that the region's problem is not a lack of water but only of the readiness of the area's countries to engage in cooperative action. Haifa University Professor Arnon Sofer believes that water disputes will serve as a pretext for war in the coming years if these countries do not take positive steps towards peace and order. A hard, punishing drought lasting a year or two in the Euphrates or the Jordan will accelerate this process. "In that case, we will find ourselves forced to fight for drinking water," he says. Various Arab experts also have concluded that the decade of the 90's will be characterized by struggles over the Middle East's limited water sources. "We must expect," they say, "that Israel will want to commandeer additional supplies of water for settling the huge wave of Soviet immigrants. That could sharpen the struggle into actual war."

A number of factors have come together to create the potential for conflicts over water in the region: the geographic structure of primary water arteries--the fact that many water sources are shared by a number of states that are not inclined to distribute them in a fair and balanced way; the fact that supplies of water are inadequate to the needs of all the countries of the region, given agricultural developments and rapid demographic growth; declining rainfall; the failure to discover new sources of water; inefficient maintenance and bungled management of water installations; and finally, outright waste. It is clear that between 50 percent and 60 percent of all water in the irrigation systems in Egypt, for example, is lost because of drainage problems and evaporation. The same phenomenon exists on the lower Euphrates.

The dispute over the waters of the Euphrates among Iraq, Syria, and Turkey is not new but has worsened recently, chiefly because of the progress made in Turkish projects for developing south-east Anatolia. Turkish dams under construction in that area are stealing vast volumes of water from her two neighbors. The central project, the Ataturk Dam completed a year ago, adds a new dimension to the dispute, especially in Turkish-Syrian relations. This dam, considered the ninth of this type in the world is located 60 km from the Syrian border. It took five years to build at a cost of one billion dollars and rises to a height of 170 meters. In Turkey, it is regarded as a prestigious and beneficial project for developing the nation's energy system. Experts expect that the extensive lands to be watered with the aid of the dam will enable Turkey to become a regional agricultural power or the granary of the Middle East. The Ataturk dam is the ninth built on the Euphrates River and experts estimate that it will fundamentally affect water supplies available to Syria and Iraq. By the year 2005, the Turks plan to build another 21 small dams on which 17 electric power plants will be constructed.

Syria and Iraq view the construction of these dams as a grave threat to their own water systems. In January 1990, Turkey cut off the flow of water in the Euphrates from Syria and Iraq to fill the reservoir behind the Ataturk Dam. For Syria, which relies on rainfall for its agriculture, the cutoff occurred during a crippling drought. Talks conducted by the three countries with an eye to fashioning a uniform water policy did not lead to concrete results. Syria and Iraq, bitter political enemies, found themselves allied against a common adversary, Turkey. They are not prepared to surrender what they call their legitimate water rights. Consequently, observers believe the possibility cannot be excluded that the two are ready to do battle to assure those rights. It is worth remembering that the Iran-Iraq war broke out over a dispute about the boundary of the Shat-al-Arab district, which is considered the richest source of fresh water in the Gulf region.

According to reports in the Iraqi media, Turkish irrigation installations are liable to impinge on 5.5 million Iraqis who live in the Euphrates basin. Some 4 percent of all agricultural land in the basin will be taken out of use. Five power generators, supplying 40 percent of Iraq's electrical needs, will be idled, while 13 million dunams of rice growing fields--about 40 percent of the country's potential--will become worthless. These reports are greatly exaggerated, for Iraq has another source of water, the Hidqal, a robust river capable of mitigating possible damage. In fact, Iraqi authorities have already begun transferring water from the Hidqal to the Euphrates north of Baghdad. "Iraq and Turkey," says Professor Sofer, "have common interests most clearly in oil matters. Turkey will find it very difficult to squeeze Iraq dry. My guess it that they will come to some compromise allowing Iran reasonable use of the waters of the Euphrates." Thus, Iraq's water situation is not critical, but that fact does not prevent the Iraqi regime from demanding that Turkey increase its allocation of water from the Euphrates or, on the home front, from exhorting people to use less water. A year ago, Sadam Husayn informed his nation: "From now on, we must know how to use less of the water we derive from the Euphrates. The water shortage is expected to last for years." At the same time, the Iraqi ministry of agriculture, in light of the forecast for an extended shortage has renewed its consideration of plans for reclaiming agricultural land.

The implications for Syria are very serious and complex. Unlike Iraq, Syria has no alternative to the Euphrates. The Syrians hold great hopes for a dam of their own on the Euphrates. They believe that the dam will meet both residential and industrial electrical needs. They laid some large pipes for bringing water from the Euphrates to supply the needs of the town of Halab [Aleppo] 200 km away, but their hopes have faded in recent years, particularly since Turkey began to carry out its own irrigation and electrical plans. As a result, water levels dropped in the river and the Asad reservoir built behind the Euphrates dam. Lower flows of water from the Euphrates into Syria have caused a considerable cut in electrical output and were reflected in dried fields of cotton and sugar beets in lands amounting to hundreds of thousands of dunams. The severe shortage of water for farming and drinking was felt when 7 turbines out of the eight built at the dam ceased to operate.

Syria attributes political objectives as well as economic ones to the Turkish water facilities. She believes that the Turks are attempting to use water as a means of putting pressure on her to accede to Turkey's border demands and security claims. It is reasonable to suppose that political calculations are mingling with others here. For a long time, Turkey has demanded that Syria stop providing assistance to the Kurds and Armenians, bands of whom are murdering Turkish diplomats around the world.

In recent years Syria has exhibited a high degree of awareness of water issues. She is trying to exploit every possible water source--the Euphrates, the A'atzi (Orontes) and the Yarmukh. Their main problem is distribution of water within the country. In August, 1986, construction of a new dam on the Euphrates, called the "Ba'ath," was completed. The Syrians are also planning to build a large dam up the Euphrates, named "Tashrin." These two dams will offer better drainage of the water flowing in from Turkey, both for irrigation and drinking purposes and for production of electricity. The Syrians are counting on that to support a host of planned development projects in the north of the country. Syria has large tracts of unwatered farm land. A quarter of Syria's population earns its living from farming and 17 percent of the national product is agricultural. Successive periods of drought since 1979 have dealt a body blow to the agricultural sector, which has prompted the Syrians to speed up the shift to a system of irrigation.

Water also has sharply divided Syria and Iraq. The Iraqis suspect that Syria is diverting more water than agreed. The waters of the Euphrates, which originate in Turkey, pass through Syria to Iraq but, the Iraqis claim, not in the proper volume.

Syrian plans of unilateral exploitation of the waters of the Yarmukh have at times struck considerable fear into the heart of the Jordanians, who have rushed to reach an agreement with Syria for joint use of the river's water. By the terms of the agreement signed by the two countries in September 1987, a dam is being erected near a power station 40 km from the city of Irbid in Syria. The dam, called the "Unity Dam," is supposed to store water for drinking and agricultural uses in Jordan. Construction of the dam might reduce the damage caused Jordan by pumping of water in the Syrian highlands but cannot solve Jordan's water problem.

Jordan is beset by severe water problems. The city of Rabat- Aman suffers from a chronic shortage of water, which is doled out by the beaker there. Rabat-Aman has a million and a quarter inhabitants. Water, which is noticeably lacking, reaches its different neighborhoods only two or three times each week. Jordan has no sources of water and supplies of water brought in are meager. The main supplies come from flows from the mountain to the valley and waters inside Jordan. Agricultures's share of the gross national product is relatively low compared to other countries in the region such as Syria and Egypt. Still, Jordan is making great efforts to muster other sources of water and is examining ways to desalinate water for drinking. Government officials are toying with the idea of a plan for laying water pipes from the Euphrates in Iraq to lands in the kingdom.

Now let us leap to the waters of the Nile. Observers are attempting to meet the threats presented by the expected rise in Egypt's population. But is that so? Nine African countries share the sources, tributaries and estuaries of the Nile. This fact is the source of political-security frictions between Egypt and her neighbors. From time to time, the nations of the Upper Nile talk with Egypt about allotments of water within the framework of the 1959 Egyptian-Sudanese agreement. Egypt argues that the treaty created a basis for allocating water, while the other countries contend that changed conditions require negotiations for a new distribution of water. In the wake of the decline of water afflicting the nine nations, some of them have begun planning dams for the creation of water projects on the Nile River.

A certain fear of Sudan and Ethiopia grips the highest circles of the Egyptian Government. The Egyptian-Sudanese agreement sets forth that Egypt and Sudan will receive, respectively, 55.5 and 18.5 billion cubic meters. This division, which was acceptable at the time of signing, has become problematic today for two reasons: the dizzying rise in population and prolonged periods of drought that prevent division of water in these volumes between the two countries. Early in 1986, the two assented to the creation of an international committee that would study means for efficient exploitation of water under drought conditions. According to reports from Arab sources, Sudan plans to irrigate 6 million fadan by the end of the century. That would require an additional 15 billion cubic meters of water. No agreement exists between Egypt and Ethiopia concerning use of the river's waters, and the Ethiopians are unwilling to recognize the Egyptian-Sudanese protocol. The same sources report that Ethiopia also is carrying out irrigation projects along the Sudanese border (beyond the Ethiopian mountains) and is planning, with Israeli assistance, to build a series of small and middle sized dams of the sort Turkey has erected.

The quarrel over the Nile has raged among states whose balances of forces are not equal. The two largest countries situated in the river's sources--Ethiopia and Sudan--are militarily and politically weaker than Egypt; moreover, the two have no concrete projects at this time that they can put into effect. Consequently, Egypt has no particular cause for concern at this moment. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Egypt has an interest in perpetuating the current instability in Ethiopia and Sudan, which makes it harder for them to realize their plans for diverting the sources of the Nile and allows Egypt to continue to draw the greatest share of the river's waters.

The primary danger from water problems threatening Egypt, however, arises from internal and not external causes. A United Nations report, prepared at the request of the Egyptian Government, has established that a decline in the volume of water entering Egypt, whether by possible diversion of the sources of the Nile or from any other cause, will create severe hardships in day to day needs for irrigation and electricity as well as for drinking. The report notes that Egypt relies in water as its sole source of energy for irrigation and electrical needs, a fact that restricts its ability to assure supplies of food and electricity to an ever larger population (Egypt's population grows by 1 million people every eight months, and more than 51 million people earn their living from farming). The water problem is also hindering realization of the government's policy of dispersing its population, and visibly having an affect on tourism. In 1988, for example, tour boats could not travel on the Nile because parts of it had dried up.

The average Egyptian now needs 2.75 cubic meters of water each day, but that "quota" is designed to shrink to just 2 cubic meters by the year 2000 as a result of the expected growth in population to 70 million people. To guarantee long-term supplies of water for irrigation and production of electricity, Egypt created Lake Nasser next to the Aswan Dam. Egypt relies on this reservoir for meeting its needs, estimated as 60 billion cubic meters per year, during dry periods. This lake, 500 kilometers wide and 10 kilometers long, saved Egypt during the years of drought that struck the nations of western Africa. Without it, scholars say, the Egyptians would have suffered a grave crisis verging on famine. In 1985, the Egyptians feared a severe shortage because if the drastic drop in water levels. Last year, after nine years of drought, Egypt enjoyed some good luck as levels finally rose. If not for that, Egypt would have been forced to scale back its agricultural acreage or abandon existing projects for expanding farm lands. That might have created internal pressures and political foment capable of upsetting the government's relative stability, or worse.

A testament to Egypt's dependence of the Nile is the fact that it represents about 95 percent of her water for drinking and agriculture. It also supplies 25 percent of Egypt's electricity, generated by the turbines at the High Dam. In the past 25 years, the average level of the Nile has dropped to the minimum, primarily because of the extended drought in the Ethiopian highlands. In Egypt proper, calls increasingly are issued for a stricter water management authority to prevent agricultural and domestic waste. Similarly, there have been demands for a hike in water rates. The water problem in Cairo is doubly bad--both shortages and contamination. These problems derive mostly from a decrepit infrastructure and overcrowding. An effort has been made in recent years with the aid of foreign assistance to improve the infrastructure. The urban population undoubtedly suffers as a result, and it may be that many Egyptians are bathing less or not at all because of the water shortage, but the water problem holds its greatest implications for the agricultural sector. There is no awareness in Egypt of the need to conserve. Egyptians believe that water is a gift of nature and so find it difficult to understand why they must make wise use of the water they drink and drip on their crops.

All the countries of the region view water, exactly like land, as an existential problem on which there can be no compromise. Experts fear that if no way out can be found, talk will give way to tanks and cannons. Water without joy.